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1.0 Chapter 1 
1.1 Background 
The southward movement of migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, to Kenya as a transit or 
destination country, has taken a multilayered and multi-causal dimension over the last 20 
years. Often, migrants who are part of this movement have in mind South Africa as their final 
destination. The movement has evolved, from one involving refugees and asylum seekers, 
categorised as forced migrants, to one which, in the 21st Century, has been typified as a mixed 
migration movement.  Mixed movements are, according to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), ‘complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, 
economic migrants and other migrants’.1 
The movement of Ethiopians and Somalis commenced in the mid-20th Century and was 
exacerbated by the fall of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia, and the Siad Barre regime in 
Somalia, in 1991.2   Influxes are dependent on the prevailing social, political, and climatic 
conditions in the regions of Ethiopia and Somalia. In Somalia, the early 1990s were 
characterised by displacement as a result of civil war. In 1991, the fall of the Siad Barre regime 
resulted in anarchy and violence. Somalis began to troop to Kenya in this period where key 
resources were controlled by warlords.  
                                                          
1Perruchod and  Redpath-Cross (2011:63). 
2 Lindley (2010:3). 
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In 1992 the registered Somali refugee population in Kenya had risen to 285 000. By 1995, the 
international community had largely withdrawn from Somalia. In September 2011, the Somali 
refugee population had surpassed the half million mark.3 This was accelerated by political 
violence and an acute drought in the Horn of Africa. 
In 2007, the border between Kenya and Somalia was officially closed.4  However, the entire 700 
km of the border is open and porous, allowing migrants to enter at their pleasure.5 Reports 
abound of harassment by Kenyan police, extortion, arbitrary arrest and the detention of Somali 
asylum seekers, refugees and Ethiopian migrants.6  The migrants are arrested, detained and 
charged with being unlawfully present in Kenya.7 Summary proceedings involve a plea of guilty, 
one year’s imprisonment in lieu of a fine, and a repatriation order.  
In Khali Abdiaziz Mohammud  and  Three  Others v Republic, the appellants were charged with 
being unlawfully present in Kenya, contrary to section 13 (2) (c) of the Immigration Act Cap 172 
Laws of Kenya (now repealed).8  The trial magistrate, in rejecting mitigating factors pleaded, 
highlighted the breach of peace, security and sovereignty as a result of the appellants’ irregular 
crossing, at a time when the Kenya-Somalia border remained closed.9 
A vicious cycle of recidivism ensues, with deported migrants, re-attempting the journey back to 
Kenya, assisted by smugglers and transnational organized criminal networks.10 The use of 
                                                          
3 UNHCR Country Operations Kenya (2012:1). 
4 BBC News (2007:1). 
5 Horwood (2009:55).   
6 HRW (2010:4); Abdi A (2011:1). 
7 HRW (2010:5). 
8 Immigration Act. 
9 Khali Abdiaziz Mohammud and Three Others v Republic [2007]. 
10UNHCR/IOM (2010:18)a.  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
smugglers decreases the risk of detection by police,  but the unofficial routes utilised consist of  
rough terrain, and a hazardous wilderness which render the migrant susceptible to the whims 
of the smuggler.11  Smugglers rarely take into consideration basic survival necessities, such as 
food for the migrants, during the journey. At times, they subject the migrants to physical abuse, 
or may even abandon them in the course of the journey when they fear detection. 
The smuggling enterprise consists of a chain of people accountable to a boss, the chief 
smuggler. The chief smuggler, a key actor in the irregular movement, is often well-known to the 
community, the smuggled migrant, and/or the financer of the transaction, and is easily 
identifiable by relevant authorities, albeit, with little or no consequence.12 Although difficult to 
estimate in scale, migrant smuggling has grown today into a multimillion dollar enterprise, 
involving transnational organized criminal elements.13 Within this context, the United Nations 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, commonly referred to as the 
Smuggling Protocol, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, came into force in 2004. 
The international legislative framework requires (a) the decriminalization of the smuggled 
migrant, whose movement is facilitated by an organized criminal group; and (b) the 
criminalization of facilitators and profiteers of the movement. The smuggling of migrants 
signals the existence of criminal elements within the community, complicity in corrupt practice 
of state and non-state actors, irregular movement and exploitation of a desperate population of 
migrants from the countries of origin. 
                                                          
11Horwood (2009:69).  
12Horwood (2009:8). 
13 Heckmann (2007:1). 
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This paper aims to assess Kenya’s progress in the implementation of the Smuggling Protocol in 
light of the substantial influx of irregular migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia. It analyzes the 
organised crime and the revised immigration legislative regime, following the adoption of a 
new constitutional dispensation in 2010. In addition, the paper assesses the deleterious effects 
of the smuggling enterprise on both countries of origin and destination. Finally, it recommends 
measures that need to be adopted to increase the protection of the growing numbers of 
migrants willing to make the hazardous journey southwards, from Ethiopia and Somalia.  
1.2 Significance of the Study 
The paper aims at reviewing the implementation of the United Nations Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, following Kenya’s accession to it in 2005. Central to 
the review will be an exploration of the Kenyan criminal justice system’s response to the 
phenomenon of smuggling. This will involve an analysis of the pertinent penal law provisions, 
relevant case law, and a profile of the perpetrators concerned. These aspects will be evaluated 
against the standards enunciated in the Smuggling Protocol.  The paper mainly explores the 
mixed migration flows from Ethiopia and Somalia to Kenya, and, where relevant, to countries 
along the Eastern migration corridor Southwards. It examines the socio-economic and political 
climate of the countries of origin, as well as the far-reaching effects of the criminality of migrant 
smuggling.  
Different and uneven criteria have been used by the Kenyan law enforcement authorities when 
considering admission for Ethiopian and Somali migrants and their subsequent access to the 
asylum process. The situation is compounded by Somalis’ prima facie refugee status and 
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Ethiopia’s bilateral agreement with Kenya, allowing each other’s citizens free passage. Despite 
this status quo, Ethiopian and Somali migrants are subjected to regular arrest, detention and 
deportation.  
The government and policymakers responsible for addressing irregular movement are primarily 
concerned with peace and security, border control and management, and safeguarding their 
prerogative to set immigration limits. The legislative, policy, and procedural paradigm to 
address the irregular movement of  migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia to Kenya, within the 
mixed migration imperative, has proved inadequate and challenging to law enforcement 
officials, including the Kenyan police, the Department of Refugee  Affairs (DRA), and the 
Immigration Service.  
A legislative and policy review is thus required. This need arises in light of Kenya’s accession to 
the Smuggling Protocol and increased irregular flows. The paper will explore Kenya’s 
implementation of the Smuggling Protocol as a means of curtailing the irregular movement of 
migrants, and curbing its deleterious effects. It will also attempt to assess how state security 
measures can be co-ordinated to deal with the problem at hand more systematically. The need 
for a mutually inclusive approach in dealing with mixed migration movements was given 
currency in the following words, expressed at a regional conference on refugee protection and 
mixed migration: ‘Border control and security issues for states and protection of migrants have 
been dealt with as mutually exclusive imperatives, which is not necessarily tenable for mixed 
migration movements and human mobility patterns in the region’.14 
                                                          
14 UNHCR/IOM (2010:12)a. 
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1.3 Research Hypothesis 
The study is based on the assumption that effective implementation of the Smuggling Protocol 
will lead to a reduction of the irregular movement of migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia and 
an enhancement of the protection of migrants who are part of these mixed flows. This 
reduction necessarily means that the existing criminal networks need to be disabled. The 
theoretical assumptions here are that the brand of criminality under discussion is caused by 
circumstances, the addressing of which is indispensable for dealing with the problem more 
comprehensively.  
1.4 Research Questions   
Kenya acceded to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2005. 
In August 2010, Kenya welcomed a new constitutional dispensation, necessitating a substantial 
reform of several laws, including the law on immigration.15 As a result, the Kenya Citizenship 
and Immigration Service Act and the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service 
Act were passed in 2011.16    The Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Act 2009, and 
the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act No.6 of 2010 also have a bearing on the issue of 
migrant smuggling. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Constitution of Kenya Fifth Schedule. 
16  These pieces of legislation repealed the post- independence Immigration Act Cap 172 Laws of Kenya, last 
amended in 1972. 
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Within this context the study seeks to answer the following questions: 
i. To what extent has Kenya included recommendations from the smuggling protocol, in 
its legislative framework? 
ii. To what extent can Kenya’s effective implementation of the smuggling protocol curtail 
irregular flows, and enhance protection for migrants who are part of the mixed 
migration movement from Ethiopia and Somalia? 
1.5 Scope of the Study  
The paper will confine itself to the irregular movement of migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia 
to Kenya, as facilitated by organized criminal groups.  It will explore the existent substantive 
criminal law provisions and sanctions suitability in addressing the smuggling of migrants, 
particularly in regard to the implementation of the Smuggling Protocol in Kenya. It will propose 
ways to curtail the irregular migration flows and the concomitant abuse of migrants’ rights, and 
investigate the possible benefits that such proposed measures could have for the two countries 
of origin, and Kenya, as the destination. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This is a desktop study. The principal primary sources are international instruments, national 
laws, national case law, reports by international bodies, international protocols and 
promulgated rules. The secondary sources consist of books, chapters in books, journal articles, 
electronic sources, proceedings of conferences and media reports.  
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1.7 Overview 
Chapter 1 is a broad overview of the study. It highlights the background to the irregular 
movement of Ethiopians and Somalis into Kenya and looks at the context within which migrants 
are smuggled. Chapter 2 explains the basic concepts and terminology used in this paper, and it 
goes on to investigate the modalities of human smuggling and deleterious effects it has on the 
countries of origin and destination. This chapter also examines the causal factors of migrant 
smuggling and, to a limited extent, existing interventions to address the irregular movement of 
people across national borders. Chapter 3 analyzes Kenya’s law on immigration against the 
international legal framework, and Chapter 4, which concludes the paper, recommends ways of 
coming to grips with the problem of migrant smuggling, particularly in respect of the 
decriminalisation of the smuggled migrant, protection of the migrants’ rights, and prosecution 
of smugglers. 
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2.0 Chapter 2 
2.1 Terminology and Conceptual Framework 
A Smuggling of Migrants 
The smuggling of migrants can be defined as ‘the intentional organization or facilitation of the 
movement of persons across international borders, in violation of laws or regulations, for the 
purpose of financial or other gain to the smuggler’. 17 The agreed-upon international definition 
is contained in Article 3 (a) of the Smuggling Protocol. It states as follows: 
‘Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident’ 
 
Article 3 (b) defines illegal entry as ‘crossing borders without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legal entry into the receiving State’. 
The definition raises a few questions. First, who are the parties involved in the smuggling 
process? Second, can a person subjected to smuggling be described as a victim of a crime, or 
would it be more accurate to label such a migrant a criminal? A smuggler is involved directly or 
indirectly in the smuggling of migrants. A smuggler is ‘an intermediary who moves a person by 
agreement with that person, in order to transport him/her in an unauthorized manner across 
                                                          
17 IOM (2012:1). 
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an internationally recognized state border’.18 The person aided by the smuggler to enter a 
country illegally is a smuggled migrant.19 
The smuggled migrant is a migrant often desperate to escape his/her current situation as a 
result of conflict, persecution, or lack of opportunity.  The demand for migration far exceeds 
possibilities to cross borders legally.20 The smuggler responds to the increased demand for 
migration by exploiting migrants vulnerabilities for profit: ‘A smuggled migrant is not 
considered a victim because he consents to being smuggled, and in certain instances, willingly 
seeks out the services of the smuggler’.21  
However, survivors of the smuggling process have detailed horrific accounts of their ordeals 
during the smuggling process. Smuggled migrants have been crammed into small windowless 
spaces filled with faeces and vomit, deprived of food and water, and witnessed their deceased 
companions’ bodies discarded at sea or in the wilderness. In this regard, smuggled migrants can 
become victims of a crime as a result of the smuggling process, and in some cases they have 
been exploited by human traffickers.22  
Ironically, most smugglers do not consider their activities criminal.23 They view themselves as 
providers of a humanitarian service, assisting persecuted populations escape to safety. 
Smuggled migrants on the other hand, do not view themselves as victims of a crime, despite 
the abuse experienced during and as a result of the smuggling process. Migrant smuggling has 
                                                          
18 Perruchod and  Redpath-Cross (2011:91). 
19 McGuirl (2011:2). 
20 McAdam (2012:3). 
21 David (2012:19). 
22 David (2012:20). 
23 Bouteillet-Paquet (2011:8). 
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been described as a complex crime that keeps evolving for the purposes of evading detection.24 
B Smuggling of Migrants versus Trafficking in Persons 
Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are distinct concepts but exhibit significant 
overlap. In some instances, what begins as a case of migrant smuggling ends with the smuggled 
migrant becoming a victim of trafficking. In practice, it has been difficult to distinguish between 
the two concepts. Trafficking in Persons is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punishing the Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol)  in 
Article 3 (a). The definition is quite lengthy but can be examined through its three constituent 
elements: the activity, the means and purpose.  
The activity involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a 
person. The means include the use of force, threat of force or coercion, abduction, fraud, 
deception, abuse of power, abuse of a position of vulnerability, or giving or receiving of 
payments. The means used negate any consent that may have been given to the activity.25The 
purpose is always exploitation. Article 3 (a) highlights the various forms of exploitation to 
include the exploitation of the prostitution of others, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. For 
the offence of trafficking to be committed any one of the items or circumstances listed in the 
three constituent elements must be present.  
For example, a young woman from Ethiopia is deceived about an employment opportunity at a 
hotel in Nairobi. When she arrives in the city she is directed to a household of ten where she 
                                                          
24 McAdam (2012.3). 
25 Trafficking Protocol Article 3 (b). 
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works 18 hours a day as a domestic worker, with little or no pay. When she complains about 
the conditions, she is threatened with arrest and deportation for her irregular status in the 
country.  
In the scenario just sketched, all the constituent elements of trafficking in persons have been 
fulfilled. The young lady was recruited through deception and subjected to servitude. Further, 
her participation in the scheme is secured by threats. Items or circumstances within the activity, 
means and purpose constitute the actus reus of the offence. 
The means mentioned above do not have to be proved where the victim of trafficking is a 
child.26 It is enough to prove that the activity took place for the purpose of exploitation. 
Trafficking in persons may be established as a strict liability offence. In jurisdictions that require 
mens rea as the subjective element of the offence, it must be proved that the perpetrator 
committed the material act with intention to exploit the victim, and knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of the conduct.27 The actual exploitation does not need to take place, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate that exploitation was the intended purpose. 
C The Similarities and differences between Smuggling and Trafficking 
Criminals may traffic and smuggle persons in the same movement, utilising similar routes and 
transportation methods.28 Smuggled migrants are more often than not willing to submit 
themselves to the smuggling process. Trafficked victims, on the other hand, do not give consent 
                                                          
26 Trafficking Protocol Article 3 (c). 
27 McGuirl (2011:6). 
28 McGuril (2011:8). 
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to their being trafficked, and where they do, it is rendered meaningless by the deception of the 
trafficker. 
i) Trans-nationality 
The smuggling of migrants must involve an element of trans-national movement. The migrant 
must cross a legally recognised border in violation of the destination country’s requirements for 
admission. Trafficking in persons occurs not only where a victim or victims are moved within a 
country, but also where they cross an international border. Victims of trafficking may be bought 
and sold to different traffickers and moved regularly from one country to another.29 Such 
crossing may be regular or irregular. Unlike smuggling, the offence of trafficking does not 
require a transnational element and is concerned with the intended exploitation of the victim.30 
ii) Consent 
The trafficked person does not consent to the trafficking process and where he does consent, 
such consent is vitiated by the means set out in Article 3 (b) of the Trafficking Protocol. The 
smuggled migrant, on the other hand, actively seeks out the smuggler, and pays for his services 
to facilitate his irregular movement to his desired country of destination. However, due to the 
sometimes hazardous conditions that smuggled migrants face they may withdraw their consent 
during the journey. 
 
 
                                                          
29 McGuirl (2011:7). 
30 McGuirl (2011:11). 
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iii) Exploitation 
The human trafficker and smuggler both engage in the illegal conduct for profit. The smuggler 
and the migrant enter into an agreement that ends upon illegal entry or crossing into the 
destination country. The consideration is a sum agreed upon which is paid by the migrant to the 
smuggler to facilitate illegal crossing. The relationship between the two presumably ends with 
the illegal entry into the country of destination.  
In contrast, the trafficker deceives his victims with the intention to exploit them.  The victim 
does not consent to the intended exploitation and the relationship between the trafficker and 
his victims may go on long after the beginning of the trafficking process. It is important to note 
that a smuggled migrant may end up a victim of trafficking, and this happens where the 
smuggler or a third party exploits his irregular status for benefit.  
D Irregular Migration 
There is no clearly accepted universal definition of irregular migration, but IOM has defined it as 
‘movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving 
countries’.31 Human trafficking and smuggling occur within the rubric of irregular migration. An 
irregular migrant is ‘a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, 
or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country’.32 
 
 
                                                          
31 Perruchod and Redpath-Cross(2011:54). 
32 Perruchod and Redpath-Cross (2011:54). 
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E Mixed Migration 
The IOM defines mixed flows as ‘Complex migratory population movements that include 
refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to migratory 
population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants’.33The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes mixed migration as ‘people travelling in an 
irregular manner along similar routes, using similar means of travel but for different reasons’.34 
Victims of trafficking are sometimes part of this movement. Human smuggling is at the centre 
of mixed migration movements and is aided by corruption during the border crossing process.35  
The challenge in dealing with mixed migration movements is to identify migrants with a 
legitimate claim to asylum and to provide appropriate assistance to other migrants who are 
similarly vulnerable, but fall outside the purview of refugee protection.  
F Refugees and asylum seekers 
A refugee is defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as ‘somebody who 
owing to a well founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is unable or unwilling to return to 
their country of origin’.36 An asylum seeker is a person who is awaiting status determination for 
refugee protection.  
Towards the end of the 20th Century the movement of refugees and asylum seekers was 
characterised as forced migration. Forced migration refers to the involuntary or coerced 
                                                          
33 Perruchod and Redpath-Cross (2011:63).  
34 UNHCR (2011:1). 
35 UNHCR/IOM(2010:3). 
36 Refugee Convention Article 1 A (2) (1951). 
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movements of people or groups of people as a result of conflict and environmental factors. It 
includes groups that may not fit within the defined limits of a refugee, such as persons 
displaced by natural disasters and those who have not yet crossed an internationally recognised 
border. The IOM defines forced migration ‘as a migratory movement in which a level of 
coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood whether arising from natural or 
manmade causes’.37 
G Organized and Transnational Crime 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) defines an 
organized criminal group in Article 2 (a) as follows: 
‘Organized  criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of 
time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established 
in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit’. 
Organised crime and transnational crime have so far evaded satisfactory definition. ‘Crimes 
such as robbery and burglary may require organising but criminologists would not necessarily 
regard them as organised crime’.38 The problem with the definitions proposed by Interpol, the 
United Nations (UN) and the European Commission (EU) is that they fail to recognise the loosely 
structured and fluid nature of most organised crime syndicates. Interpol defines organised 
crime as ‘[a]ny group of criminals that have a corporate structure, whose primary objective is to 
obtain money and power through illegal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption’.  
                                                          
37 Perruchod & Redpath-Cross (2011:39). 
38Wright (2007:2). 
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Smuggling networks in the East African region do not exhibit a corporate structure; they are 
more loosely- structured and constantly assume new formations, as required, to achieve   
desired criminal objectives. Transnational organised criminal groups do not operate only at 
national level, for they are inherently of a transnational character, plying their criminal trade 
across international borders. Transnational crime gives cross-border criminal activities a more 
concrete label and has resulted in a better understanding and classification of such activities.39 
2.2 History of the Southward Movement of Somalis and Ethiopians 
Since the 1970s, the Horn of Africa, which is made up of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and 
Sudan, has been known internationally as a region whence refugees emanate. Involuntary 
movements in the region have been attributed to the overthrow of the Ethiopian Imperial 
government in 1974, Eritrea’s struggle for independence, the 1977-8 invasion of Ethiopia by 
Somalia and the civil conflict in Somalia and Sudan. Environmental factors, famine and poverty 
have also contributed to involuntary movements.  In order to gain political mileage, 
Government, in some instances, has also contributed to irregular movements. 
A Somalia 
Prior to being colonised, the Somali republic was largely democratic and egalitarian. In 1960, for 
the first time, the independent Republic of Somalia, organized itself along the precepts of 
western democratic ideals.40 British Somaliland and the Italian administered South 
amalgamated to form the Republic of Somalia.  The newly formed Republic did not last. Its 
                                                          
39 Reichel (2005:7). 
40 Gundel (2002:256). 
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failure can be attributed to failed attempts at Pan-Somalism, and by its inability to provide 
adequate civic amenities. Pan-Somalism proposed unification of the present day Somalia, with 
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, present day Djibouti and Northern Kenya, as well as the right to 
self-determination of the Somali people living outside Somalia. Other contributing factors were 
the bloated bureaucracy which could not be sustained by a disproportionately weak domestic 
economy, divisive politics and corruption. 
In 1969, the last democratic election held in the Republic of Somalia led to the formation of a 
de facto one party state. Public dissatisfaction with this unfolding of events led to the 
assassination of the President and a military takeover. Siad Bare, previously commander of the 
army, became the President. The State took on a socialist orientation, and in 1977, following a 
renewed attempt at Pan-Somalism, Somalia attacked Ethiopia. The conflict, in which Somalia 
was defeated, spawned the first movement of Ogaden refugees fleeing from Ethiopia to 
Somalia.41   
Clan polarization, endemic war, famine, starvation, and growing inequality in contravention of 
the Somali egalitarian ideal led to the collapse of the state in January 1991. Large flows of 
people, estimated at 1 million, followed, to surrounding countries and destinations outside 
Africa. Mohamed Farah Aided, who took over from the military overthrow of Siad Barre, died in 
Mogadishu in 1996, succumbing to wounds sustained during fighting in the capital. 
                                                          
41 Gundel  (2002:257). 
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Today, the anarchy and polarisation that has characterised the post-independent State of 
Somalia more or less continues.42  Numerous attempts have been made to re-establish social 
and political cohesion, but with mixed success. A failed United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
mission, backed by United States of America (USA) marines, was withdrawn in 1995. A 
fourteenth attempt to establish a central system of government resulted in the election of 
Abdullahi Yusuf as President in 2004. This transitional parliament was inaugurated in Kenya.  
The transitional parliament met for the first time in Baidoa, Somalia in 2006. Successive years 
have been characterised by heavy fighting between the transitional government and Islamists 
wrestling for government control. This state of affairs, which has been aggravated by periodic 
spells of severe drought, has resulted in a deepening humanitarian crisis. An African Union (AU) 
Peace Keeping mission backed by the United Nations (UN) arrived in Mogadishu in December 
2007.  At the end of 2008, President Yusuf resigned following a vote of no confidence in his 
government. He was replaced by the moderate Sheikh Sharif, who was elected by parliament. 
 Towards the end of 2011, and going into 2012, an AU peace keeping mission supported the 
government’s forces to wrestle major cities from the al Qaeda-linked Islamist group, al 
Shabaab. In August 2012, the first parliament in more than twenty years was sworn in, in  
Mogadishu, and Hassan Sheik Mahmoud was elected President. This was the first 
democratically elected government in Somalia since 1967.43  
                                                          
42 Foreign Policy, ‘Failed State Index’ Somalia tops the top failed state index, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive accessed 19th April 2012. 
43 BBC Somalia Profile available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (accessed 19 June 2012). 
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The Somali community is primarily pastoralist in nature, with an agriculturally based economy. 
Their nomadic, pastoralist nature can be attributed to the people’s search for work and study 
opportunities elsewhere. This has been the case since the 1920s, and most recently their 
movement has been attributed to compromised human security.  The fall of the Siad Barre 
regime, followed by the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war and famine during the 
repressive years of the warlord Farah Mohamed Aideed guerrilla insurgency, begun in earnest, 
and accelerated mass movements from Somalia.  
More affluent Somalis moved to North America, Europe and the Gulf States, while the less 
affluent ones moved to Kenya and surrounding countries in the East African region.44 Conflict, 
poverty, drought and food security have escalated the movement in recent years. 
High profile visits to Mogadishu, Somalia by the Turkish Prime Minister, and the Secretary 
General (SG) of the UN Ban Ki moon in 2011, may be indicative of the changing fortunes of the 
country. In addition the AU peace keeping mission has more or less assisted Somali forces 
disable al Shaabab in 2012. Kenya recently decided to move its consular office to Somalia from 
Nairobi, where it was located for security reasons, to Mogadishu the capital of Somalia. To be 
very optimistic, the election of a President in Mogadishu in 2012 may signal the beginning of a 
very long road to peace in Somalia. 
B Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, a poor country in the Horn of Africa, with a population of 83 million, is plagued by 
various challenges, including catastrophic famines leading to food insecurity, overpopulation, 
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drought, political instability and ethnic conflict.45 Unemployment is estimated at 48% for the 
urban population of men aged between 15 and 30 years.46 
Ethiopia was traditionally ruled by emperors until the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974. The country 
then came under the socialist rule of the Derg regime.  During this time civil liberties were 
repressed and movement outside Ethiopia was restricted. The regime, subsequently led by 
Haile Miriam Mengistu, was overthrown in 1991 by a coalition consisting of different ethnic 
groups, the Ethiopians People Liberation Front (EPLF). The flow of Ethiopians in earnest started 
in 1991 but has increased in recent years.47 
Between 1991 and the year 2000 Ethiopia separated from Eritrea, adopted a constitution, 
conducted the country’s first elections and signed a peace agreement with Eritrea to end a 
bitter conflict.48 The country also suffered catastrophic famines in the mid-1970s through to the 
1980s. In earlier times, migration was primarily dictated by political persecution and conflict, 
but the reasons of movement have lately shifted to economic ones.49  
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who died in 2012, ruled with an iron fist, repressing media, 
political and academic freedom. High unemployment rates in urban areas constitute a push 
factor for international migration. Young men perpetually dream of a better life outside of the 
confines of Ethiopia, but limited opportunities exist to migrate legally. Studies have shown that 
Ethiopian migrants typically spend 1-3 years in Kenya before migrating west.50 The growth of an 
                                                          
45 Fransen & Kuschminder (2009:4). 
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economically active population, coupled with conflict, environmental degradation, and 
economic decline, have increased labour and forced migration from Ethiopia to countries within 
the East African Region and beyond. 
2.3 Situation of Smuggled Migrants in Kenya 
Kenya hosts the largest population of Somali refugees, and is well documented as a regional 
hub for the smuggling of migrants and the obtaining of false documentation.51 Prison facilities 
in Moyale, Isiolo and Marsabit are reportedly overcrowded because of the high number of 
migrant arrests. Refuge protection and assistance is jointly coordinated by UNHCR and the DRA.  
Until recently, migrant smuggling within the organised crime context had not been defined by 
the Kenyan legislature. In 2011, the Kenya Citizenship Act adopted a definition similar to the 
one contained in the Smuggling Protocol.  Policy makers, civil society and the media often refer 
to the smuggling and trafficking of migrants interchangeably, failing to recognise the mutual 
exclusivity of the terms. 
 The exact number of persons smuggled from Somalia and Ethiopia into Kenya is unknown due 
to the clandestine nature of the movement.  A provincial police officer in the coastal province 
of Kenya estimates that about 140 trafficked people or smuggled migrants are arrested every 
week , which brings the  annual total to 7280 arrests.52 An immigration officer reported that 
between 70 and 100 irregular migrants are deported every month.53 The Kenyan media 
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frequently report on stranded Ethiopians in remote areas and harboured migrants in various 
locations in Nairobi. 
 Migrants who have served their sentence for being illegally present in Kenya are not deported 
immediately, but may continue to languish in Kenyan prisons for some time.54 Data collection, 
which is an indispensable tool used to gauge the number of smuggled people, and which should 
serve as a basis for determining an appropriate response to the smuggling of migrants, is still 
far from satisfactory. 
2.4 Smuggling of Migrants within the Organised Crime Context in East Africa 
At the onset, it is important to note that the smuggling networks present in the Horn of Africa 
and in East Africa which facilitate the movement of migrants to Kenya and further south, have 
an informal structure.  The networks consist of opportunistic individuals, in contrast to the 
hierarchical structured groups, as is the case with large organised crime syndicates which 
operate in the West.  An IOM report on the movement of migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia 
to Kenya, and further south has compared the facilitator’s modus operandi to that of courier 
service providers, with slight variations.55  
Taxi, bus and truck drivers, as well as bush guides and those who enter into contracts and 
accompany migrants on illegal crossings, are all considered smugglers because they derive 
benefit from the movement. The typical smuggler is an 18 to 40 year old male of Ethiopian or 
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Somali origin.56 A young Ethiopian woman based outside of Nairobi, and known by immigration 
officials, has also gained notoriety for being part of the smugglers’ movement.57  
The IOM study found that the linchpin managers in the smuggling chain are Somalis who are 
situated in the major cities in East Africa and at key transit points such as ports, refugee camps 
or border areas. The managers work with the chief smugglers. They typically sub-contract 
transportation, bush guide or facilitator servicers from the local pool of opportunistic criminals. 
The smuggling managers located at different points of the journey are central to the smuggling 
chain and are paid to move a group of people from one point to another by the chief smuggler, 
who is at the top of the chain and not necessarily based in a similar city.  
The managers are very flexible, work independently, and make their services available to local 
and chief smugglers across the border. Somali smugglers generally work with fellow clansmen 
throughout the network, and four Ethiopian brothers were identified as having spread 
themselves out along the southern route, defending each other’s interests and ensuring control 
of their network.58  Immigration and police officers interviewed in the IOM study revealed that 
the smuggling manager’s mobile phone is his main tool of trade, as it contains a list local 
transporters, compromised government officials, managers and chief smugglers in other 
locations.  
The IOM study compared the human smuggling model in Eastern African to the Mexican one, 
which has been described as the supermarket model. Comparatively, both models are relatively 
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low cost, exhibit high rates of failure at border crossings, repeated attempts, are run by 
multiple actors who act independently or are loosely affiliated to one another, and do not have 
a strong hierarchy or a violent organisational discipline. Their business is based on the 
capitalistic ideal of maximizing profit, and they compete fiercely with each other. 
 The smugglers are aware that they are operating unlawfully and know full well what the 
consequences will be when they are caught, but they also know that where a bribe fails, the 
worst thing that can happen to them is their having to pay a modest fine or facing possible 
deportation. Smuggled migrants are driven to Nairobi in lorries fitted with fake bottoms, and 
they pay between $600 and $700 to transport two men without papers to Nairobi.59 A self 
confessed Somali smuggler interviewed at a prison in Mombasa said that Somalis are always on 
the run to safety, with Kenya being one of their primary destinations.60 He said that he charges 
$120 per migrant smuggled and carries up to 120 migrants per trip when business is booming. 
The smuggler owns a boat that brings migrants to the shores of Kenya’s coastal province. 
The large Ethiopian and Somali Diaspora community pay a large sum of the smuggling expenses 
through the Hawala system, which is an informal way of transferring money from one place to 
another without it having to cross borders.  Nairobi is a key location for receipt of the 
payment.61 As such, there is no paper trail that connects smugglers to the illicit business.  The 
Somalis are predominantly financed by the Diaspora while a significant number of Ethiopians 
are financed through the sale of private family assets. Among both communities, however, the 
decision to move is often a collective one, viewed as an economic investment by relatives and 
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clan members.62 The Western Union Money transfer system and Mpesa, a mobile cash transfer 
system, is also used in Kenya. Nairobi is the headquarters of the Hawala system and the place 
where most of the fees are paid for undertaking the smuggling journey.  
2.5 Modalities of the movement  
Human smuggling from Ethiopia and Somalia generally occurs within the dynamic of mixed 
migration movements. The migrants within these movements constitute refugees, asylum 
seekers, economic migrants, and in some instances, victims of trafficking. Some of the migrants 
are destined for Kenya, in search of protection and for economic reasons, but many of them 
use Kenya as a rest stop, while their documentation is processed and arrangements are made 
to re-finance their onward journey.63 Smuggled migrants from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia make 
contact with major smuggling organisers in Nairobi.64 Research and press reports have noted 
that most of the migrants have in mind South Africa as their final destination.  
The movement is organised by smugglers in violation of the laws of both transit and destination 
countries. There is evidence that young men in rural areas in Ethiopia are actively targeted by 
smugglers, who entice them with a better life.65 ‘Smugglers run well-organized, dynamic 
operations that involve a constantly changing network of collaborators, including recruitment 
agents, truck drivers and transporters, boat owners, providers of forged and stolen documents, 
border guards, immigration and refugee officials, members of the police and military’.66  
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It has been estimated that up to 50 Somali smuggling groups control the irregular migratory 
route to Southern Africa.67 Alleged corruption and complicity of national officials appear to be 
driving the smuggling of migrants and exacerbate a situation where pubic officials abuse their 
position for private gain.68 Public officials, particularly in the North Eastern Province of Kenya 
bordering Somalia, have been implicated in corruption as a result of their intermediary role 
between government offices and migrants in transit.  
A Kenyan police officer interviewed for the IOM study stated that the extent of public officials’ 
collusion with smugglers implies that they play an integral part in the illegal and abusive 
enterprise.69 On the Somali side of the Kenya-Somali border, at Dobley, a network of smugglers 
offer young men a more attractive option than the Daadab refugee camp.70 
Most Somalis do not have a recognised valid passport that would allow them to engage in 
regular means of travel. They travel from Mogadishu and Kismayo by boat to Mombasa, 
Kenya.71 Vessels from Kismayo bring dried fish and human cargo to the old port in Mombasa, 
Kilifi, Lamu and to unregulated ports along the North Coast. Migrants are transported in small 
overloaded boats exposed to the elements. From Mombasa, they often wait long periods for 
promised transport or a guide. Some of them are transported to Shimoni, from where they are 
transported to Tanzania by boat a few hours away en-route to South Africa. Bribes smooth 
things over with the authorities at Shimoni. Immigration officers claim they are ill-equipped to 
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intercept the movement along the 110km coastline from Likoni to Vanga, which has an 
estimated 176 illegal entry points.  
Somalis are also smuggled with the assistance of brokers directly from Mogadishu to Nairobi, or 
via Nairobi to South Africa. They enter Kenya by four wheel drive vehicles or lorry via Dhobley, 
close to Kenya’s Liboi border with Somalia. The migrants who opt for this passage most often 
have a legitimate asylum claim and use the services of smugglers as the only means of accessing 
protection. The largest community of Somalis in Kenya, after Daadab refugee camp, reside in 
Eastleigh in Nairobi where a large network of smugglers and their agents are also unsurprisingly 
present. 
Ethiopia has a bilateral agreement with Kenya to allow each other’s citizens free passage. 
Despite this, Ethiopians travelling by bus, truck or on foot are required to pay bribes to Moyale 
border immigration officers through brokers, regardless of the status of their documentation.72 
The bribe is between $250 and $450 for a travel stamp. The profits from this activity are shared 
among government officials in Moyale and the provincial headquarters in Garissa. There are 
Ethiopian migrants who travel through the bush to avoid paying the corrupt passage fee. On 
being intercepted, these migrants are heavily extorted because the loot does not have to be 
shared among as many actors. Further payments from smuggled migrants are required at road 
blocks on the journey towards Nairobi.  
Ethiopians travel from Moyale and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by road, through Moyale, Kenya, to 
Nairobi, and may proceed to the  Mombasa or Namanga borders with Tanzania for their 
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onward journey South. Moyale is a major nexus for smuggling and sixty per cent of the town’s 
income is said to derive from the business: As noted in the East Africa Standard: 
‘They sneak Ethiopians into Kenya at the Moyale border and transport them to Nairobi via Isiolo. But the 
final destination is always in South Africa or Europe. Ethiopians get into Kenya through Moyale, Dukana 
and Forolle in North Horr, Bute in Wajir North and Takaba in Mandera West. However, most of them 
connect to Isiolo from Moyale using cattle tracks passing through Merti to avoid arrest. This is a big 
business and it is very difficult to fight the cartels, some that operate in Ethiopia and South Africa. But we 
are liaising with the Immigration Department to see how we can beat them’.73  
In December 2010, the town of Isiolo recorded more than 300 arrests of Ethiopian and Somali 
migrants. Stricter surveillance in Garissa has made smugglers turn to the Isiolo route to prevent 
detection. Mandera, the farthest corner in North Eastern Kenya, is also a gateway for many 
Ethiopians and Somalis coming into Kenya. Similar accounts of bribery, extortion and complicity 
of public officials in the smuggling of migrants through Moyale abound. A tribal chief 
interviewed in the IOM study confirmed that human trafficking is a big business in Mandera, to 
the extent that its interception could trigger a clan war.74 
2.6 Linking the causal factors to the movement 
The most obvious reason for Somalis leaving their country is violence brought about by the 
political situation. In 2011, increased fighting between government forces and two Islamist 
groups, Hisbul Islam and al Shabaab, coupled with a crippling drought situation, gave rise to an 
unprecedented movement of Somalis from the Southern and Central region into Kenya and 
surrounding countries.  
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Somalis also move to escape personal persecution as a result of their political affiliation, clan 
membership and gender.  Their departure is also prompted by their desire to evade forced 
conscription into the army and because they need to gain access to basic commodities such as 
food, medical services, healthcare and more viable livelihoods.75 The IOM study revealed that 
war and insecurity was the number one reason for the exodus from Somalia, followed by 
unemployment and poverty.76 
Ethiopia has not experienced the level of violence present in Somalia. However, political 
oppression and economic stagnation have impelled a mass exodus from the Southern part of 
the country.  The Oromo people in the South and South East of the country have felt the 
unwelcome winds of political oppression and economic marginalization, which have driven 
them to leave the country.77 Avoiding recruitment and desertion from the army has also forced 
many young men to leave Ethiopia.  
However, at the centre of these departures remains the search for a better life encouraged by 
the perceived prosperity of neighbours whose sons have already made the movement.78 In the 
IOM study, over half of the respondents stated that they left their homes for reasons of 
unemployment.79 Respondents also cited the pursuit of greener pastures due to poverty, 
insecurity and war. 
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2.7 Deleterious effects on the countries of origin and destination 
Human smuggling signals the existence of corrupt networks of government and private citizens 
involved in bribery and extortion.  It is much more broadly linked to issues of good governance, 
state transparency and accountability.80 Human smuggling is a profitable, illicit business whose 
proceeds are untaxed and may be used to fund other criminal activities. The Hawala system has 
been found to be used to transmit most of the illicit proceeds from smuggling activities, thus 
ensuring no paper trail. Hundreds of migrants continue to die due to suffocation as a result of 
the perilous journey. The youth, being a valuable human resource for any country, is wasted in 
the case of Somalia and Ethiopia. Kenya is plagued by insecurity, a surging population that it is 
unable to sustain, corruption, possible money laundering evident in its booming real estate 
industry, and related criminal conduct, including corruption, piracy and terrorism. 
2.8 East and Horn of Africa Response to the Smuggling of Migrants.  
The East African Community Common Market Protocol signed by the respective countries’ 
heads of state entered into force on 1 July 2010. The Protocol envisages free movement among 
citizens in the East African region. Sudan is exploring prospects of joining the community and 
perhaps Ethiopia and Somalia will be party in the future, dependent on prevailing 
circumstances in those countries. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
Regional Consultative Process (RCP) on Migration held its first meeting in 2010 and a 
subsequent meeting in 2012 in Addis Ababa. The IGAD-RCP was established to facilitate 
regional dialogue and policy issues amongst IGAD member states. It provides a platform for the 
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respective member countries to discuss and agree upon mechanisms to address the smuggling 
of migrants.  Both Ethiopia and Somalia are IGAD member states. In 2010 a Regional 
Conference on Refugee Protection and International Migration: Mixed Movements and 
Irregular Migration from the East and Horn of Africa to Southern Africa was held, to encourage 
constructive discussion among states and other stakeholders on the problem regarding the 
mixed movement of people southwards. Participants from Ethiopia and Somalia were in 
attendance.  Migrants’ rights, enhanced legal migration alternatives and border migration were 
discussed. An action plan was adopted, addressing legislation, capacity building, outreach, 
cooperation, data collection and operations.81 A follow-up conference was scheduled for 2012, 
but is yet to take place. A joint commission meeting for technical cooperation between Kenya 
and Tanzania agreed to enhance cooperation to control smugglers and to curb irregular 
migration.82 
2.9 Conclusion 
Smuggling of migrants to Kenya from Ethiopia and Somalia is part of the mixed migration 
movement. Kenya is a major transit hub for this movement. Many migrants have South Africa in 
mind as their final destination.  Smugglers facilitating the movement of migrants to Kenya and 
beyond operate in a fluid manner, subject to the currents of demand and supply. Their main 
aim is to maximize profit, which in turn fans fierce competition among smugglers. The welfare 
of the migrant is of little priority to the smuggling business. Migrants suffer abuse along the 
journey, including starvation, severe beatings, extortion, blackmail and the rape of women and 
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children. The Kenyan leg of the journey is the least harsh compared to further strips down 
south.  
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3.0 Chapter 3 
3.1 International and National Legislative Framework  
A Introduction 
Smuggled migrants are comprised of economic migrants; asylum seekers or refugees; irregular 
and legal migrants; and in some instances victims of trafficking and other crimes. Human 
smugglers constitute a complex network of interrelated actors who run a business like 
enterprise, as well as, opportunistic individuals in the right place at the right time. A legislative 
response to the smuggling of migrants should encompass prevention, protection, prosecution 
and cooperation. This response should be guided by human rights standards, refugee and 
humanitarian law. The primary international legal instruments and customary law principles 
propagating these tenets will be discussed below as far as they relate to the treatment of 
smuggled migrants.  
The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol), 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), 
was agreed upon, as a comprehensive instrument to address the smuggling of migrants. At the 
centre of the instrument is the decriminalization of the smuggled migrant and criminalization of 
financers and profiteers of the smuggling process. The Smuggling Protocol provisions, read 
together with UNTOC, in so far as they relate to the smuggling of migrants, are thematically 
addressed below, as a precursor to accessing Kenya’s implementation of the Smuggling 
Protocol. 
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3.2 The International Legislative Framework 
Broadly, UNTOC addresses trafficking of women and children; the smuggling of migrants; and 
the manufacture and traffic in illicit firearms.83  The purpose of UNTOC is to promote 
cooperation, prevention, and to combat transnational organized crime. 84  These objectives are 
aimed at addressing conduct criminalised pursuant to Article 3. The criminalised conduct 
includes: participation in an organized criminal group; laundering of the proceeds of crime; 
corruption; obstruction of justice; and serious crime.  Article 2 of UNTOC defines a serious 
crime as an offence which carries a penalty of 4 or more years of imprisonment. The 
criminalised conduct must be of a transnational nature, and must involve an organized criminal 
group.85 The criminalised conduct under UNTOC is implicit in the smuggling of migrants.  
The Smuggling Protocol must be read together with UNTOC.86 In this regard, ratification of the 
Protocol is conditional upon the acquiescence of a States Party to UNTOC.87 The Smuggling 
Protocol was necessitated by the need for a comprehensive instrument to address the 
smuggling of migrants in light of the involvement of increasingly organized components. Its 
purpose is to prevent and combat the smuggling of persons; protect the rights of migrants; 
promote cooperation and information exchange; and to address the root causes of smuggling.88  
The Smuggling protocol has been criticized for placing little emphasis in responding to the root 
causes of smuggling. It alludes to root causes in the preamble and Article 15.3, which addresses 
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development programmes and cooperation.89 The smuggling protocol is a law enforcement 
instrument as opposed to a human rights instrument. Despite its focus on prosecution and 
criminalization of various facets of smuggling, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) takes the position that the instrument provides mandatory provisions for the 
protection of smuggled migrants. The preamble to the Smuggling protocol and its Articles 2, 4, 
14(1), 14 (2), 16 and 19 provide for the protection of smuggled migrants.90 UNODC encourages 
countries to adopt a human rights based approach when implementing the Smuggling 
Protocol.91 
A Prevention 
States Parties to UNTOC are advised to adopt appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures to prevent transnational organized crime.92 Part III of the Smuggling Protocol 
provides for prevention, cooperation and other measures. The measures should address public 
awareness, enhanced border control, documentation integrity, and development programmes. 
i) Public awareness  
Public awareness is aimed at addressing the existence, causes, gravity and threat of 
transnational organized crime.93 It is envisaged that such measures will deter migrants from 
submitting themselves to the smuggling process. Effective public awareness requires a 
substantial amount of resources. Such resources are seldom made readily available by the 
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Governments in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. The efficacy of awareness raising campaigns is 
also difficult to gauge particularly where it targets vulnerable populations that lack alternatives. 
ii) Border Control Measures 
 Article 11 of the Smuggling Protocol requires States to enhance border protection measures to 
prevent and detect smuggling. The Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Ethiopia border are both vast 
expanses of porous terrain. A recent initiative to curb irregular migration has been the 
introduction of a mobile truck unit by the Kenya Immigration Department to better police the 
Kenya-Somalia border. 
iii) Document Integrity 
The integrity of travel documents should be of such calibre as not to be easily misused, altered, 
or duplicated.94 The Smuggling Protocol recommends the prohibition of commercial carriers 
from engaging in the smuggling of migrants. Carriers are responsible for confirming the 
integrity of travel documentation. Carriers should be penalised where passengers are in 
contravention of entry requirements. The most applicable sanction is a fine. In extreme 
situations States can consider withdrawing the licence of the carrier. Entry requirements should 
be restricted for smugglers. States Parties are required to clarify questions on document 
integrity without delay in suspected cases of smuggling.95 It should be noted that the modus 
operandi of smuggling from the Horn, South, does not rely on travel documentation. 
Commercial carriers are also being utilised less due to a perceived heightened risk of detection. 
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iv) Development Programmes 
The socio-economic circumstances of the countries of origin Ethiopia and Somalia constitute a 
major push factor for migrants. Article 15 (3) requires States Parties to put in place appropriate 
development programmes to address the root causes of irregular migration. Improving the 
social economic circumstances of migrants would eradicate a major push factor. However, the 
effects of such measures where possible to implement, are unlikely to be immediately felt. 
Cooperation, both financial and technical, is integral in actualising such development 
programmes. 
B Protection and Assistance 
i) Witness Protection 
Smuggled migrants are privy to valuable information pertaining to the smuggling process, the 
individuals involved, routes utilised and corrupt state and non state apparatus facilitating the 
movement. As a result, they can be subject to reprisals by their smugglers, particularly where 
they choose to cooperate with law enforcement as envisaged under Article 26 of UNTOC. 
Article 24 and 25 of UNTOC provides for the protection of victims and witnesses. Article 16(2) 
and (3) of the Smuggling Protocol provides for the protection of smuggled migrants from 
violence and assistance where the life of the migrant is at risk. 
ii) Human Rights 
Smuggled migrants are human beings first. Appropriate measures should be put in place by 
States Parties to the Smuggling Protocol for protection and assistance of smuggled migrants. 
Their fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed in the Preamble of the Smuggling 
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Protocol. The Smuggling Protocol reiterates the right to life, and the right not to be subjected to 
torture, inhumane or degrading treatment.96 Detention, the most common response in Kenya 
for smuggled migrants, should be a last resort.97 Where detained, migrants should be allowed 
access to their respective countries consulate services.98 Women and children are vulnerable to 
sexual and physical abuse during the smuggling process. The Smuggling protocol recommends 
States Parties make special provision for assistance to this vulnerable group. Provision is also 
made with regard to entry onto vessels on the high seas. The integrity, life and cargo aboard 
the vessel must be preserved.99 
iii) Assisted Voluntary Return 
Ideally, the return of smuggled migrants should be voluntary. Voluntary return for smuggled 
migrants is mostly untenable because legal avenues do not exist to regularise their stay. The 
Smuggling protocol does not make it mandatory for States Parties to facilitate return. State 
Parties participation in return includes verification of nationality of smuggled persons, and 
issuance of documentation to facilitate return.100 Return should be effected in an orderly and 
dignified manner. The Smuggling protocol contains minimum standards and States Parties 
should actualise return for smuggled migrants more effectively through negotiated bilateral 
agreements. 
iv) Refugees and Asylum seekers 
Refugees and Asylum seekers benefit from international protection pursuant to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the now customary law principle of non-
                                                          
96 Smuggling Protocol Article 16 (1). 
97 David (2010:75). 
98 Smuggling Protocol Article 16 (4), Vienna Convention Article 36. 
99 Smuggling Protocol Article 9 and Part II. 
100 Smuggling Protocol Article 18. 
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refoulement.101 In recognition of their right to international protection they are excluded from 
the provisions of the Smuggling Protocol.102 They should not be discriminated against for being 
part of the mixed migration movement. 
C Prosecution and law enforcement 
Criminalization of organised criminal activity, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of 
justice are required by UNTOC to promote uniformity in the laws of States Parties and enhance 
cross border cooperation.103 According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
Recommendations 2012 migrant smuggling is a predicate offence.104 Corruption facilitates 
smuggling, and obstruction of justice may undermine efforts to prosecute smugglers.105   
Offences at the domestic level may be established independently of the involvement of an 
organized criminal group. Criminal, civil or administrative liability including monetary sanctions 
should be imposed for both natural and legal persons.106 An effective response to the 
smuggling of migrants requires cooperation among law enforcement agencies across States 
Parties.107   
The Smuggling Protocol criminalises the smuggling of migrants.108 It provides for the prevention 
of smuggling, protection of smuggled migrants and cooperation among States Parties to 
effectively address migrant smuggling. The smuggled migrant should not be criminalised for 
                                                          
101 Refugee Convention Article 33 (1). 
102 Smuggling Protocol Article 19. 
103 UNTOC Article 34 (2). 
104 FATF (2012:111). 
105 McAdam (2012:23-4). 
106 UNTOC Article 10. 
107 UNTOC Art 26. 
108 Smuggling Protocol Article 6. 
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being part of the smuggling conduct.109 However, countries maintain their sovereign right to 
prosecute illegal entry.  
i) Offences 
The Smuggling protocol requires the criminalisation of the offences listed in the table below. 
The conduct of migrant smuggling or activities aimed at facilitating the process of migrant 
smuggling should be established as offences in States Parties domestic legislation. Attempting, 
assisting as an accomplice and organising or directing the commission of the offences listed 
below should also be criminalised. Aggravating circumstances should be established for all 
offences in circumstances that endanger the life and safety of migrants or entail inhuman or 
degrading treatment, including the exploitation of migrants. 
 Offence Attempt Accomplice Organisers and Persons 
giving Direction  
1. Smuggling of Migrants yes yes yes 
2. Producing a fraudulent 
travel or identity documents 
yes yes yes 
3. Procuring, providing, or 
possessing a fraudulent 
travel or identity document 
yes yes yes 
4. Enabling illegal residency yes yes yes 
 
                                                          
109 Smuggling Protocol Article 5. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has suggested additional offences to 
Article 6 of the Smuggling Protocol in as far as they conform to the legal system of a State 
Party.110 Two considerations should be borne in mind by the relevant authority before 
preferring a charge for the suggested offences. First, the relevant authority should be able to 
prove the offence and not merely burden the charge. Secondly, care must be taken not to 
deviate too far from the primary offence. The offences are divided into five categories: 
transport, document, immigration, crimes of dishonesty and other offences. They include: 
misrepresenting cargo or identity at the border, handling stolen property (passports), fraud or 
forgery, harbouring an immigration offender, money laundering, abuse of office, murder, 
assault, trafficking in persons, and sexual offences amongst others. 
D Elements of the Crime 
Generally, there must be facilitation or assistance as well as profit from such facilitation or 
assistance for the offence of migrant smuggling to be proved. 
i) Material Elements 
• The presence of a material or financial benefit. 
• Procurement of Illegal entry or stay. 
• The crossing of an international border. 
 
 
                                                          
110 Price and McAdam (2010:6-7). 
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ii) Intention 
The smuggling of migrants must be committed with the intention to obtain a financial or 
material benefit.111 Persons who deal with migrants other than for profit should not be held 
liable for the offence of migrant smuggling.  
E Jurisdiction  
A complimentary jurisdiction regime exists between UNTOC and the Smuggling Protocol. Article 
15 (1) (a) and (b) of UNTOC reflect the territoriality principle, and Article 15 (2) (a) and (b) 
provide for the nationality principle. A State Party has an obligation to extradite or prosecute. 
States Parties are required to adopt legislation that will facilitate prosecution of perpetrators 
present on their territory who have committed any of the offences in UNTOC. Where parallel 
investigations are being conducted by one or two States Parties Article 15 (5) requires 
competent authorities within those States Parties to coordinate their investigative efforts. 
F International and Regional Cooperation 
UNTOC is an instrument of cooperation. It seeks to promote uniformity in enumerated offences 
among States Parties. Article 27 provides for cooperation among States Parties law 
enforcement authorities, and cooperation among law enforcement and related agencies within 
a State Party. Cooperation is envisaged in the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, extradition 
with or without an extradition treaty, transfer of sentenced persons, and mutual legal 
assistance.112 States Parties are required to cooperate with developing countries and countries 
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with economies in transition, to enhance their financial, material and technical capacity to 
combat transnational organized crime.113 
Part II, Article 7 of the Smuggling Protocol addresses the smuggling of migrants by sea, and 
provides for cooperation among States Parties to prevent and suppress the smuggling of 
migrants pursuant to the international law of the sea. States Parties particularly those with 
common borders or who are located on migrant smuggling routes are encouraged to share 
information amongst themselves for purposes of achieving the objectives of the Smuggling 
Protocol. Information exchanged may include routes, carriers, identity and modalities of 
organized criminal groups. The exchange of information can also include legislative practices 
and technical information to assist law enforcement address migrant smuggling. A State Party 
can classify information shared as confidential. Article 11(6) of the Smuggling Protocol requires 
States Parties to consider the establishment and maintenance of direct channels of 
communication among border control agencies. 
Cooperation is envisaged in training of immigration officers and other relevant officials to 
prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants.114 The objective of training and technical 
assistance: is to promote the humane treatment of migrants; improve detection mechanisms 
and intelligence gathering on the modalities of the crime; enhance fraudulent identity 
document detection; and improve the security and quality of travel documents.  A critical 
omission in the Smuggling Protocol is capacity building in the identification of smuggled 
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migrants, despite such recommendation during negotiations.115 States Parties are required to 
consider entering into bilateral, regional, and operational agreements as a means of enhancing 
the provisions of the Smuggling Protocol.116 
G Shortcomings of the Smuggling Protocol 
Before embarking into Kenya’s’ implementation of the Smuggling Protocol, it is important to 
note down some of the instrument’s shortcomings.117 The Protocol is an international 
cooperation agreement to address the organized context of smuggling as opposed to a human 
rights treaty, advocating for the rights of smuggled persons. The protection mechanisms, 
especially as they relate to children, are insufficient. Mechanisms to identify smuggled migrants 
are not elaborated, and assisted return for smuggled migrants is not guaranteed by the State 
Party whose nationality they hold.  
Lack of mechanisms to identify smuggled migrants is obviously problematic for numerous 
reasons.  First, the State Party which has custody of the smuggled migrants is unable to elicit 
important information from the migrant on the intricacies of the criminal activity. Secondly, the 
Trafficking Protocol creates weightier obligations with regard to the protection of victims of 
trafficking than the Smuggling Protocol does for smuggled migrants. It can be argued, that it 
would be more advantageous for a State Party to classify a victim of trafficking as a smuggled 
migrant as a means of evading necessary protection and assistance modalities required for 
trafficked victims. 
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The Smuggling Protocol also fails to recognize the important overlap and distinction between 
trafficked and smuggled persons.118 Smuggled migrants can, and often times, end up victims of 
trafficking. Trafficked persons under the Trafficking Protocol are recognized as victims while the 
status of smuggled migrants is not so clearly defined. Article 5 of the Smuggling Protocol 
recommends that smuggled migrants should not be criminalised for merely being part of the 
smuggling conduct. Article 6 (4) of the Smuggling Protocol however, allows States Parties to 
prosecute migrants for contravening legally established entry requirements. So far States 
Parties focus has been on prosecuting the smuggled migrant. Some States Parties assist 
migrants based on their consent to cooperate with law enforcement. Lack of cooperation 
means prosecution for illegal entry while cooperation allows exemption from prosecution. 
Article 5 and 6(4) places the smuggled migrant in a disadvantageous position whereby he has to 
cooperate with law enforcement or face prosecution for illegal entry. 
On a positive note, Article 19 excludes refugees and asylum seekers from the provisions of the 
Protocol. Often times this category of migrants has to rely on smugglers for their conveyance to 
safety.  Article 19 is in line with Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention. 
3.3 National Legislative Framework on Migrant Smuggling 
A Introduction 
The presence of smuggled migrants within a country in large numbers arouses discomfort in 
both governments and citizens. Governments look to their compromised national security 
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systems, while citizens grapple over service delivery issues, and perceived loss of employment 
and business opportunities. Of primary concern to any government and citizen is that the 
infiltration of smuggled migrants into the country is indicative of the proliferation of organized 
criminal elements.  
Ideally, human smuggling should not be addressed under a States Parties immigration law but 
within the context of the organised crime regime. The Smuggling protocol addresses migrant 
smuggling occurring within an organized criminal context. An individual migrant crossing into 
Kenya from Ethiopia, on his own, after deliberately avoiding immigration officials, is not subject 
to the Protocol but may be liable for illegal entry under Kenya’s immigration laws.  
UNTOC and the Smuggling Protocol must be read together. In this regard, efforts to assess 
Kenya’s implementation of the Smuggling protocol must consider domestic measures put in 
place to give efficacy to UNTOC. Consequentially, the present modalities within Kenya’s 
jurisdiction for the treatment of smuggled migrants will be assessed in tandem with 
immigration laws, which currently provide the bulk of the legislative framework governing the 
movement. 
3.4  Kenya’s Procedural and Legislative Response 
The modus operandi to address the smuggling of migrants thus far has been effected quite 
summarily.  Migrants intercepted during the smuggling process are arraigned before 
subordinate courts by immigration officers with prosecutorial powers.  They are then charged 
with being ‘unlawfully present’ in Kenya. The accused then plead guilty to the offence, and are 
fined or sentenced to a jail term not exceeding twelve months in lieu of a fine. This sentence is 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
accompanied by a deportation order. The Kenyan Penal Code, read together with the 
Immigration Act, provides the impetus for the deportation order.119 The relevant provision 
states that where a person is convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding twelve months, a court may order that the person be removed from Kenya, 
immediately or on completion of any sentence of imprisonment. 
The Kenyan police have been criticised for their notoriety in arresting arriving Somalis and 
charging them or threatening to charge them with being unlawfully present in Kenya.120 Threats 
by police are aimed at extorting bribes from the migrants. Police stationed in the vicinity of the 
Liboi border area extort money from thousands of Somali asylum seekers who cross the border 
in vehicles with the help of smugglers.121  
In the unreported case of R v Hussein Galgalo and Two others122, the accused persons of Somali 
origin were charged with being unlawfully present in Kenya contrary to Section 13 (2) of the 
Immigration Act. They were found guilty and subsequently sentenced to 6 months’ 
imprisonment and were thereafter subject to repatriation. A judicial review of the decision set 
aside the conviction on the ground that the plea was improperly administered and the accused 
persons were not availed an interpreter during court proceedings. The case is however 
illustrative of the treatment of smuggled migrants in Kenya where intercepted by law 
enforcement.  
                                                          
119 Penal Code Section 26 A.  
120 HRW  (2010:5). 
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Until the recent enactment of the Kenya Citizenship Act No.12 of 2011, law enforcement 
officials were in a quandary as to which appropriate offences to prefer on the facilitators and 
profiteers of human smuggling. Currently, the treatment of smuggled migrants is still 
reminiscent of the now repealed Immigration Act. In the Mohamed Sirajesh Mohamed case,123 
the accused, a man of Somali origin, was found without travel documents following the 
interception of a public transport vehicle at a road block about 60 kilometres from Nairobi. The 
accused was charged in the Senior Resident Magistrates’ Court at Kajiado on 7 November 2011 
with offences under section 53 (1) and (2) of the Citizenship Act. He pleaded guilty and on this 
plea was liable to a fine of Kshs 200 000 or 1 years imprisonment in lieu of the fine. The court 
issued an additional order that he be repatriated.  As a result of the intervention of the UNHCR, 
acting through a legal aid organisation, Kituo cha Sheria, the repatriation order was substituted 
by an order that Mohamed be handed over to UNHCR as a person of concern. 
3.5         Organised crime regime 
 
1) Prevention of Organized Crimes Act No.6 of 2010 
The Prevention of Organized Crime Act (Act No.6) is a national law aimed at the prevention and 
punishment of organized crime and the recovery of proceeds of organized crime.  Act No.6 
came into force on 23 November 2010 and domesticates UNTOC. It criminalizes organised 
criminal activities and the obstruction of justice. It also provides for tracing, confiscation, 
seizure and forfeiture of property.  Act No.6 defines an organized criminal group in a similar 
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manner to UNTOC. However, a serious crime under Act No. 6 is any offence punishable by a 
prison term of at least 6 months pursuant to the Laws of Kenya, as opposed to 4 years as 
provided by UNTOC.124  
An additional proviso to the serious crime definition under Act No. 6 is dual criminality. Where 
criminal conduct committed in a foreign jurisdiction is also criminalized under the Laws of 
Kenya, such conduct shall constitute a serious crime.  A serious crime under Section 2 of Act 
No.6  is a felony. However, the Penal Code Cap 63 classifies an offence punishable by 6 months 
or less a misdemeanour, creating a conflict.   
i) Offences 
Participation in an organised criminal activity is proscribed. Death as a result of such organised 
activity is an aggravated circumstance to the offence.125 The penalty is imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding fifteen years, or a fine not exceeding Kshs 5 million or both, and life 
imprisonment respectively. A person engages in organised criminal activity in the following 
circumstances:126 
• Where he/she is a member of organised criminal group; 
• Where he/she recruits members; 
• Where he/she acts in concert with other persons in the commission of a serious offence 
for profit; or 
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• Where he/she uses his membership to direct commission of a serious offence, threatens 
violence or retaliation in connection with the organized criminal group amongst other 
activities. 
 The Act was passed to stem increased kidnapping and extortion of ransom, drug trafficking, to 
curb the criminal activities of the al Qaeda linked terrorist group al Shabaab, and to address the 
criminal activities of the outlawed Mungiki sect.127  The provisions in Section 3 read together 
with Section 4 can be utilized to address the smuggling of migrants. Similarities between 
offences in the Act No.6 and Article 6 of the Smuggling protocol include: 
• Aggravated circumstances resulting from organized criminal activity; 
• Membership of an organized criminal group; 
• Conduct related to document fraud;  
• Retaliation or violence towards smuggled migrants; 
• Attempts, aiding and abetting. 
The penalty for attempts, aiding and abetting is a fine not exceeding Kshs 1 million and/or 
imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years. The Court in determining whether a person is a 
member of an organised criminal group should consider the person’s own admission, the 
reasonable circumstances pointing to membership, visible affiliation with an organized criminal 
group, and receipt of financial or material benefit from such group.128 
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Act No.6 is quite narrow in comparison to UNTOC which it seeks to domesticate. The Act does 
not provide for the protection of victims as proposed during debate after the bill’s second 
reading.129 The law’s connection to trafficking in persons as an organised crime was recognised, 
but no similar correlation was drawn to the smuggling of migrants. During debate, it was 
further noted that the provisions of UNTOC were not adequately addressed by the debated 
draft. Never the less, the draft was more or less passed in that form. As such, it leaves gaps in 
crafting an appropriate response to the progressively sophisticated mechanisms and modalities 
of organized crime, including the smuggling of migrants, which it does not directly consider.130  
2) Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Act 2009 
Kenya passed the Proceeds of Crime Act in June 2009 to provide for the offence of money 
laundering and to include measures for combating the offence, as well as identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime and connected purposes.131 Like the 
serious crime definition under Act No.6, the definition of the offence includes conduct 
amounting to a crime in a foreign jurisdiction. The Proceeds of Crime Act adopts the all crimes 
approach with regard to predicate offences.132 This approach was supported by the Minster for 
Finance, Mr. Kimunya during the second reading of the bill as follows: 
‘Mr. Speaker, Sir, traditionally, money laundering was associated with disguising money acquired 
from the proceeds of drug trafficking. But this is increasingly being viewed as limited, since money 
acquired dubiously can also be laundered. It is, therefore, prudent not to link money laundering to a 
particular crime, but to acknowledge that as long as there is evidence of an attempt to de-link 
money acquired illegally from the crime from which it was earned and, subsequently, integrate the 
money into the economy as genuine money, then money laundering has occurred.’133 
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In addition to drug trafficking the Minister highlighted smuggling and prostitution rings as 
examples of offences where large illegal proceeds are generated and laundered to enable 
criminals enjoy their benefits.134 In this regard, where a smuggling related offence is committed 
under Act No. 6 then it follows that the proceeds of this offence, where they are disguised or 
there is an attempt to disguise them, should fall under the Proceeds of Crime Act. Section 2 
defines proceeds of crime as any property or economic advantage realized in connection with 
an offence, including property that is successfully converted or transformed, as well as, 
economic gains realized from that property from the time the offence was committed.  
The offence of money laundering is established under section 3, 4 and 7. In summary, the 
offence is applicable: 
• To any person who knowingly deals with proceeds of crime in order to conceal their 
nature, source, location, disposition movement or ownership;   
• Enables a person who commits an offence to avoid prosecution;   
• Removes or diminishes any property realized from the commission of an offence;   
• Where a person knowingly acquires, uses, or has possession of property that constitutes 
whole or part of the proceeds of an offence; and  
• Where a monetary instrument is transmitted and received with intention of committing 
an offence.  
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Penalties are provided in Section 16. Natural persons are liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 14 years, and/or a fine not exceeding Kshs 5 million. Where the value of the property 
laundered exceeds the value of the fine, the amount fined shall be commensurate with the 
value of the property. In the case of corporate bodies, they shall be liable to a fine not 
exceeding Kshs 25 million or the value of the property laundered, whichever is higher. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act is not without controversy. It is linked to the International Money 
Laundering Abetment and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001, Act 3 of the dreaded American 
US Patriot Act, which contains radical measures to combat the financing of terrorism.135During 
debate, the bill was criticized for being contextually misplaced in a country whose economy is 
primarily cash-based, with little data or consumer protection safeguards.136 
3) Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2011 
The Mutual Legal Assistance Act governs requests made for mutual legal assistance by Kenya’s 
law enforcement agencies, prosecution service or judicial authorities to analogous authorities 
in foreign jurisdictions and vice versa. 137 The Act governs situations in which a relevant 
agreement for mutual legal assistance exists, as well as situations where no such agreement is 
in place. The Act does not preclude agreements or arrangements in respect of cooperation 
between Kenya, other States and international entities on legal assistance, and allows broader 
assistance than may be provided for in an agreement.138 Specific requests for assistance 
directed to Kenya may relate to examination and attendance of witnesses, service of 
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documents, provision or production of records, and lending of exhibits among others.139 
Broadly speaking, it may constitute a basis for cooperation in information gathering and 
investigation of the transnational organized movement of migrants from the Horn of Africa and 
beyond. 
3.6 Immigration and Penal regime  
1) Immigration Act Cap 172 Laws of Kenya 
The Immigration Act140 constituted the substantive and procedural regime applied to smuggled 
migrants. The Act came into effect in 1967, shortly after independence, and as such, could not 
have captured the human mobility and security situation that exists in the Horn of Africa today.  
The statutes falling within the organised crime regime were all drafted after 2010. The domestic 
legislative regime relating to asylum seekers and refugees is also relatively new and awaits 
revision in light of a new constitutional framework. The protection of migrants within the 
forced migration discourse is a creature of the 21st Century, and not fully appreciated by law 
enforcement officials and relevant actors. 
Mass irregular influxes of Ethiopians and Somalis have until recently been dealt with under the 
rather archaic Immigration Act of 1967.  The immigration offences were enumerated under 
section 13 of Cap 172. Entry document fraud, forgery, tampering, illegal stay and harbouring 
were prohibited conduct. The penalty was a fine not exceeding Kshs 100 000, and/or 3 years 
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imprisonment.141 Section 13 (2) criminalised obstruction of an immigration officer, and unlawful 
entry or residence or harbouring, for which a fine of Kshs 20,000 accrued, and/or imprisonment 
for a term of 1 year.  
Obstruction of an immigration officer did not exclude the right against self incrimination. 
Smuggled migrants were dealt with under the terms of section 13 (2) (c).  They were routinely 
rounded up, and charged with being unlawfully present in Kenya. In most instances a fine was 
paid and an order of deportation attached to the judgement. The migrants were then dropped 
at the border of their respective country and left to their own devices. In most instances they 
would re-attempt the journey to Kenya. 
2) The Kenyan Citizenship Act No.12 of 2011 
Human smuggling is defined in Section 2 of the Citizenship Act. The Citizenship Act adopts a 
similar definition to the Smuggling Protocol save that human smuggling under the Citizenship 
Act  applies to illegal entry, as well as, exit. Trafficking in persons is also defined in section 2 
through cross reference with the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act No. 8 of 2010, which 
adopted the definition in the Trafficking Protocol. According to the Citizenship Act a smuggled 
migrant is a victim of a crime. Internationally, the smuggled migrant is not recognised as a 
victim because he consents to being smuggled.  However the harsh realities of the smuggling 
process often leave the migrant a victim of one crime or another. A smuggled migrant who is 
employed irregularly is exempt from prosecution if he is willing to assist in the prosecution of 
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his smuggler.142 The Citizenship Act does not decriminalise the smuggled migrant as required by 
Article 5 of the Smuggling Protocol.  
A Prosecution 
i) Offences 
General offences, offences related to documents, and fines are provided for under section 53, 
54 and 55 of the Citizenship Act. The general offences broadly relate to:  
• Misleading, obstructing, exercising undue influence, or impersonating an immigration 
officer;  
• Illegal entry or presence in Kenya;  
• Facilitating illegal entry or exit;  
• Harbouring;  
• Contravening the conditions of a work permit;  
• Engaging in employment or business in contravention of employment regulations 
ascribed to foreigners;  
• Engaging in the smuggling of migrants;  
A person who commits any of the above offences is liable to a fine not exceeding Kshs 500 000 
and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years.143 Document related offences 
encompass falsifying, defacing, counterfeiting, illegally parting with possession, or illegal 
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confiscation of a passport, travel related document or residence permit.144 The penalty is a fine 
not exceeding Kshs 5 million and/or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.145 Foreign nationals 
who have exceeded their stay are subject to a fine not exceeding Kshs 50 000.146 The 
Citizenship Act provides a general penalty of Kshs 1 million and/or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 5 years where no specific penalty is ascribed to an offence.147 
ii) Powers of an Immigration Officer 
Immigration officers have powers of investigation and prosecution in subordinate courts 
pursuant to any offence or suspected offence under the Citizenship Act, and have similar 
powers and immunities as those conferred by law to a police officer.148 An immigration officer 
has the power to confiscate or suspend the passport or travel document of a person engaged in 
drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, human smuggling and other 
transnational crimes.149A passport or travel document may also be confiscated or suspended 
where the holder is involved in passport or document fraud, forgery or transnational crimes.150 
An immigration officer is given discretion to grant temporary entry, transit or residence to 
prohibited immigrants.151 Entry may be denied to a person who fails to produce a valid or 
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acceptable passport or travel document to an immigration officer, with the exception of 
refugees.152 
iii) Prohibited Persons 
The description of a prohibited immigrant in the Citizenship Act captures persons who are 
involved or suspected to be involved in conduct of a transnational nature.  Pursuant to section 
33 a prohibited immigrant is a foreign national: 
• Who commits or is suspected of committing an offence under an international treaty or 
convention ratified by Kenya; 
• Who engages in human trafficking, sexual offences and sex crimes; 
• Who engages in trafficking or smuggling into and out of Kenya for the purposes of 
engaging in sexual offences; 
• Who is suspected of being engaged or facilitating trafficking; 
• Who engages in any activity detrimental to the security of Kenya or another State. 
• Who is involved in terrorism; 
• Who is engaged in money laundering; 
• Who knowingly and for profit aids, procures or encourages persons who are not citizens 
to enter Kenya illegally; 
• Who is seeking to enter Kenya Illegally; or 
• Whose refugee status has been revoked pursuant to the Refugees Act of 2006.153 
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iv) Removal and Deportation 
The power to remove persons unlawfully present in Kenya is provided in section 43. The 
Cabinet Minister can make an order for any persons whose presence is declared to be unlawful 
to be removed from Kenya. The person against whom such an order has been made shall be 
returned to his place of origin, place of habitual or permanent residence, place of nationality or 
citizenship or a place where he requests to be taken to, provided that the place consents to his 
admission.154 A deportation order should be effected 90 days from the day it was issued and 
may not be extended by a court of law for more than 30 days.155 
B Prevention  
i) Duties and Liabilities of Carriers 
A carrier ‘includes any ship, boat, aircraft, wagon, truck, or any other vessel of conveyance’.156 
The duties and liabilities of carriers are established under Section 44 of the Citizenship Act. The 
owner or agent of a carrier, conveying passengers to and from Kenya, is required to furnish the 
immigration officer at the first port of entry or exit with a list of passengers.157 Failure to furnish 
such a list results in a surcharge not exceeding Kshs 200 000 and in default, detention of the 
carrier at the owner’s cost.158  The carrier may also be charged with removal of a prohibited 
immigrant and expenses incurred by the government in relation to such immigrant’s 
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transportation, maintenance and upkeep.159 A surcharge of Kshs 1 million or detention of the 
carrier also accrues for passengers without valid or forged travel documents.160 The provision is 
aimed at deterring carriers from engaging in the smuggling or trafficking of migrants. A person 
in charge of a carrier may arrest and place under custody passengers who do not have the 
necessary travel documents and an immigration officer has the power to enforce this 
measure.161  
ii) Harbouring 
Measures aimed at preventing the harbouring of irregular migrants are provided in Section 47. 
Persons or facilities offering accommodation have a duty to ensure customers produce identity 
documents pertaining to their citizenship prior to admission.  Further, facilities and persons 
offering accommodation are required to maintain a record of foreign nationals in the 
prescribed form. Failure to comply will render businesses or persons offering accommodation 
criminally liable for the offence of harbouring unless the contrary can be proved.162The 
provision is in conflict with the common law presumption of innocence in seeking to deter the 
smuggling of migrants. 
 
 
                                                          
159 Citizenship Act Section 44 3 (b) and (c).  
160 Citizenship Act Section 44 (3) (d) and (e). 
161 Citizenship Act Section 44 (4) and (7). 
162 Citizenship Act Section 47 (3) and (4). 
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C Protection  
i) Asylum seekers 
Migrants facing persecution have a right to enter Kenya to seek asylum. Section 34 (1) of the 
Citizenship Act acknowledges this right. Asylum seekers do not have to possess a valid pass or 
permit for legal entry into Kenya. Additionally, refugees and asylum seekers are exempted from 
producing valid passports or travel documents when entering or leaving Kenya pursuant to 
section 48 (1) (c) of the Citizenship Act.   
ii) Holding facilities 
Reception centres and holding facilities are integral to the protection of migrant’s rights. 
Migrants are able to access shelter, emergency medical assistance and other basic necessities 
at such facilities. Currently, reception facilities do not exist at border areas where migrants can 
seek assistance or relevant information to direct them to appropriate assistance. Section 50 of 
the Citizenship Act provides for holding facilities at ports of entry and exit and any other 
immigration areas for deportees. Such facilities are set aside for persons whose citizenship is 
not established, deportees in transit, and persons denied entry and awaiting return, who are 
not under carrier liability. At such facilities, smuggled migrants can receive assistance, as well 
as, establish contact with law enforcement for the prosecution of their smugglers. A deported 
migrant may be kept in police custody, prison or an immigration holding facility until his 
departure from Kenya.163 
                                                          
163 Citizenship Act Section 43 (2) (b). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The Citizenship Act defines the offence of human smuggling and other related organised 
criminal offences. The Citizenship Act also makes provision to deter and criminalise carriers 
from engaging in the smuggling of migrants as recommended by the Smuggling Protocol. 
However, the smuggled migrant is not exempted from criminal prosecution as required by 
Article 5 of the Smuggling protocol. Numerous document-related offences, harbouring, and 
interfering with the duties of an immigration officer, either through misrepresentation or 
exerting undue influence, are also enumerated under the Citizenship Act. Many of the offences 
can be utilised to prosecute smugglers.  The Citizenship Act recognizes the right of entry for 
refugees and asylum seekers, and provides for holding facilities for persons of concern to 
immigration officers. Such facilities can provide temporary shelter and other basic needs to 
smuggled migrants who have suffered abuse during their journey.  
The Citizenship Act constitutes the first attempt by the Kenyan legislature to capture the human 
smuggling offence, which was previously not provided for under domestic law. However, 
including smuggling and related offences in the domestic immigration legislative regime is not 
recommended internationally as a best practice. The offence of smuggling should be dealt with 
separately under the organised crime framework of a State Party. The possible complicity of 
immigration and law enforcement officers, which occurs in many cases of smuggling, is also not 
directly considered in the Act.  
In summary, the Citizenship Act does not adequately provide for the protection of smuggled 
migrants, the prevention of smuggling, or cooperation among relevant actors and States, 
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essential, in combating and addressing the smuggling of migrants. However all the statutes 
discussed under this Chapter can be utilised by law enforcement authorities to prosecute 
various facets of the offence human smuggling. 
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4.0 Chapter 4 
4.1 Recommendations and Conclusion 
The tide of migration from the Horn of Africa southwards is nowhere near dissipation. It is likely 
to continue, mutating to avoid detection. Moreover, opportunistic criminals will continue to 
scuffle for the spoils of the irregular movement.  An isolated response by Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Kenya would be too narrow and simplistic for such a complex migratory phenomenon. 
However, given the centrality of Kenya to this movement, a coalition of interventions among 
these three countries may actually hold the key to stemming the movement southwards. At the 
very least a coordinated response among the three countries may succeed in ceiling corruption 
loopholes, or harnessing some sort of economic gain from the movement for the countries 
involved. 
4.2 Prevention 
The first strategy adopted needs to be aimed at preventing the movement. A logical approach 
would be to begin by addressing the root causes of the irregular movement. Root causes 
cannot, however, be addressed in isolation of the countries of origin. Governments in these 
countries have to include interventions in their long-term development plans and make 
commensurate budgetary allocations towards such interventions. For Somalia, such 
development programmes may not be immediately feasible.  For Ethiopia, with its established, 
albeit authoritarian government, such programmes can immediately begin to be actualised. 
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Kenya, as a country of transit and destination, in collaboration with the countries of origin, 
should try to isolate the economic advantage deeply embedded in this movement. Ethiopia and 
Somalia both possess a large pool of human resources by virtue of their youthful and energetic 
populations. Keeping the youthful population economically engaged, in lieu of strained 
economic circumstances, is not a problem unique to Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya, South Africa 
and most developing countries are privy to this dilemma. 
Kenya has implemented a ‘Kazi kwa Vijana’ (work for young people) and a youth labour export 
programme. The programmes are aimed at providing youth with work opportunities locally and 
abroad. The youth labour export programme seeks to identify foreign labour markets that can 
benefit from the large skilled and unskilled human resource present in Kenya. South Africa is 
implementing an expanded public works programme to increase access to the labour market, 
particularly for the youth. There is no reason why Ethiopia cannot follow suit, expanding 
legitimate avenues for migration for those who so desire. Expanded opportunities to migrate 
would require access to valid travel documentation for youth in Somalia, a possibility not yet 
completely feasible in that jurisdiction.  Overtime however, such strategies may become 
applicable to Somalia.  
Kenya stands to benefit, and is already arguably benefiting, from the savvy business acumen of 
the Somali community.  Enhanced engagement with this potential economic resource should 
encourage the establishment of legitimate business practice and enterprises. 
The second point of intervention for Kenya would be to eliminate the real or imaginary 
bottlenecks that block entry into Kenya for Ethiopians and Somalis.  This would entail tackling 
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corruption at the points of entry. Public information campaigns may prove a useful resource in 
this regard. The Kenya-Somali border, by its very geographic nature, is porous despite official 
closure by the Kenyan government in 2007. Inadequate resources have been cited as a major 
impediment in the effective policing of this border. However, the Government of Kenya (GOK) 
simply has to remunerate law enforcement officers better. That immigration officers earn in the 
ambit of $200 is unrealistic. A new wage bill can obviously never rival what is made in corrupt 
proceeds. However, having been cited numerous times as a motivation for the corrupt practices 
of law enforcement officials the situation requires urgent redress by the GOK.  
Lastly the age-old adage, “knowledge is power”, remains valid.  Humanitarian interventions 
aimed at providing Ethiopian and Somali migrants with crucial information, especially with 
regard to the right to seek asylum in Kenya, would benefit them enormously. Informing the 
migrants of their rights necessarily entails the corollary obligation on the part of the Kenyan 
state to ensure that those very rights are safeguarded. It is indeed ludicrous that migrants from 
Ethiopia have free passage to Kenya, but are still compelled to pay large amounts in bribes for 
visitor’s stamps.  The information campaign would need to be accompanied by a legislative 
review on the entry and stay in Kenya of Ethiopian migrants. Such a review should not 
necessarily result in the curtailing of entry, for this might have just the opposite effect. Perhaps, 
free entry should be expanded to include the right to freedom of movement and to gain access 
to economic opportunities for Ethiopians in Kenya. For instance Kenya is nearing the end of 
negotiation for a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia to allow Kenyan traders free movement in 
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their country.164 This is a commendable starting point and if commensurate can expand the 
legal migration options for Ethiopians. 
Public information campaigns must be geared towards dispelling myths and prejudices 
associated with migration. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, the USA was very seductive for 
aspirant Kenyan emigrants, but this is no longer the case, as potential migrants have since come 
to learn of the trying conditions under which African migrants in the USA have to live.  Perhaps 
this change of mind has to do with the fact that Kenya has become much more democratic in 
recent years, with more opportunities opening up in the economy. Not to derogate from the 
fact that development can off course also be credited for this shift, information on the quality 
of life from the large Kenyan Diaspora community in the USA has no doubt dampened the 
desire to migrate to America. In this regard, information on the dangers of such irregular 
movement must be made known to migrants, and their expectations of a better life in countries 
on the Eastern migration corridor southward, effectively managed. 
4.3 Prosecution 
The decriminalisation of the smuggled migrant and the criminalisation of facilitators and 
profiteers of this movement cannot be overstated.  Thus far, Kenya has dedicated the bulk of its 
resources and time to the prosecution and deportation of the smuggled migrant, as opposed to 
organisers, facilitators and profiteers of the movement. Presently, law enforcement officers can 
no longer claim a restrictive legislative framework. The smuggling of migrants is now defined in 
the Kenya Citizens and Immigration Act and is also criminalised. The Prevention of Organised 
                                                          
164 Mumo (2012:1). 
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Crime Act and Prevention of Money Laundering Act can also be used creatively to prosecute 
conduct related to the smuggling of migrants.  
The smuggled migrants themselves constitute an invaluable resource in identifying and 
providing supporting evidence in the criminal trials of their smugglers. Kenya should consider 
dealing with irregular migrants, particularly from Ethiopia and Somalia, administratively, as 
opposed to subjecting them to detention and prosecution. Somalis should be directed to the 
asylum process. Ethiopians in collaboration with their government should be granted safe 
passage and assisted return where necessary. Intermediate to the above interventions should 
be the provision of humanitarian assistance to smuggled migrants.  
Impunity cannot continue to persist with regard to corrupt public officials fuelling the irregular 
movement.  Targeting foot soldiers that collect extorted funds for prosecution or 
administratively for disciplinary action, including summary dismissal, may curtail the practice. In 
recent years the Kenya Revenue authority has tightened loopholes for corruption beginning at 
the lowest level. As a result revenue collection has increased. A similar model should be 
explored for the Kenya immigration and police service. 
4.4 Protection 
Irregular migrants are human beings first before they are smuggled migrants. The Smuggling 
Protocol is a law enforcement instrument. It clearly did not conceptualise the catastrophic 
humanitarian crisis present in Somalia today. The Smuggling Protocol may also be far from 
relatable to the economic peculiarities, coupled with political persecution, experienced by 
some sections of the Ethiopian population.  
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As already stated, the tide of the irregular movement seems destined to persist for a long time. 
Unfortunately, not all smuggled migrants fit within the ambit of protection guaranteed by the 
International Legislative Framework relevant to refugees and asylum seekers. It is 
acknowledged that migrants’ rights are abused during the smuggling process. Additionally, 
what begins as a mutual agreement may end up an exploitive situation, whether or not it 
strictly fits within the legal confines of human trafficking. 
Suggestions have been made for the creation of reception centres where migrants can receive 
emergency and humanitarian assistance as well as access relevant information while their 
status is being determined. This may become rest stops that migrants make during the 
smuggling process, however, the benefits of registering and preserving the human condition of 
such migrants outweigh such risk.  Assisted voluntary return, where possible, needs to be 
coordinated with respective governments and relevant international actors in order to grant 
migrants safe passage for their return. 
4.5 Cooperation 
It is established that refugee protection is a shared international obligation. Transnational 
movements cannot also be tackled devoid of international cooperation and support. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, efforts have been made at the regional level to address this movement. 
Tanzania and Kenya are in the process of signing a bilateral agreement to control smugglers and 
curb illegal transit through their common borders.165The Regional Consultative initiative being 
                                                          
165 Tanzania Daily News(2012:1). 
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spearheaded by UNHCR and IOM, in collaboration with relevant government departments, 
harbours great potential to collectively address irregular flows from Ethiopia and Somalia.  
4.6 Conclusion 
A supportive legislative framework may be the catalyst to stem irregular movement from the 
Horn of Africa southwards. However, too often, the perception of corruption, poor legislation, 
and poverty are related to this movement in such abstract terms, that they can only be a 
scapegoat - an excuse for policy makers and implementers of that policy to shun their duties 
and obligations, and a crutch, migrants falsely make use of to justify their actions. 
The smuggling process is expensive. Money paid to facilitators can without doubt be utilised 
legitimately in the country of origin to improve the status of migrants and their families in a 
much more sustainable manner than the unknown hazards that they are likely to encounter 
elsewhere. Money paid to facilitators can be ploughed back creatively into the economy of 
Ethiopia, thus helping to churn the economy. 
Kenya has no excuse for failing to chastise the corrupt conduct of public officials. Lack of 
political will, and the low public service wage bill can no longer be entertained, at the grave 
expense of security and smuggled migrants dignity. Laxity in security was heavily paid for by 
Kenya in its 2011-2012 war efforts in Somalia. It may be argued that the war wage bill could 
have been put to better use, paying and equipping security apparatus in the country. This 
would have better capacitated them to prevent the kidnappings that precipitated Kenya’s war 
intervention. Migrants and citizens alike have a duty to refuse to condone public acts of 
corruption where relevant authorities have failed. 
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With regard to legislation, South Africa in redressing human trafficking has put in place 
commendable measures to address human trafficking without specific legislation on the issue. 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have rushed to legislate against human trafficking but their 
practical response, nowhere near rivals, measures put in place in South Africa.  The Department 
of Foreign Affairs in South Africa has provided financial support to IOM to implement capacity 
building, awareness raising and victim assistance programmes for victims of trafficking. This is 
not in any way to disparage the primacy of effective legislative measures to redress the 
contemporary challenges of the 21st Century. However, Kenya must simply maintain a 
commitment to practically address the irregular flows from its neighbours, prosecute criminal 
elements facilitating these flows, and protect the rights of migrants caught in the cross fire. The 
country, dealing with a very large refugee population, would benefit immeasurably from 
increased international support in shouldering this burden. 
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